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The ability of humans and animals to survive in a constantly changing environment is a 
testament to the power of biological processes. At any given instant in our lives, we are faced with 
an enormous number of sensory stimuli, and we can typically generate an equally large number of 
behaviors. How do we learn to ignore irrelevant information and suppress inappropriate behavior 
so that we may function in a complex environment? 
In this chapter we discuss motivation, the internal force that produces actions reflecting the 
interactions between our needs and the demands of our environment. We will first discuss what 
psychologists mean when they refer to motivation, and then review neural network theories that 
can expbin how motivation arises within biological nervous systems. 
Psychological definition of motivation 
Psychologists have developed a wide range of definitions for motivation. Hebb (1966) defined 
motivation as the "tendency of the whole organism to produce organized activity." Motivation 
can also be described in terms of behavior produced by an animal. Hinde (1970) proposed that 
11111otivr1tional phenmnena are those in which dt;:Htges in responsiveness to o constant external 
stimulus can be ascribed to the changing nature of the e1nimal's internal state." PrimMy in most 
definitions of motivation is the idea that external (sensory) stimuli are combined with internal 
needs to produce purposive behavior. 
The concept of motivation is related to, but distinct from other concepts, such as instincts, 
drives, and niflexes. A motivated behavior is usually goal-oriented, and the goal may be associated 
with a drive such as hunger or thirst. However~ motivation is closely tied to sensory stimuli: we 
do not normally exhibit eating behavior unless food is presented. Unlike instinctive behavior, 
motive1tion depends on affect (emotional state). Finally, motivation can be learned and typically 
elicits more complex behaviors than simple reflexes. 
Research aimed at clarifying the n1e<1ning and origin of motivation frequently examines the 
activity of an <1nimal as a function of external stimuli and the animal's internal condition, which can 
sometimes be manipulated or monitored through physiological variables. The study of motivated 
behavior might ex<1mine, for instance, how an animal is able to maintain a constant goal-oriented 
activity as the surrounding stimuli change, or how an animal is able to spontaneously switch 
between behaviors in a const<mt environment as the animal's needs change. In this context, 
hmneostasis and biological rhythrns are frequently studied as they are important indices of an animal's 
drives or internal needs. 
In this article we will first focus on Hull's theory of motivation. The quantitative nature of 
Hull's theory provides a framework within which neural network theories of motivation can 
C. Dorman and P. Gaudiano, Motivation 1 
be compared and contrasted. Hull (J 943) proposed that "the initiation of learned, or habitual, 
patterns of movement or behavior is called motivation." In addition, Hull proposed a distinction 
between primary tnotivation, the evocation of ilction in relation to primMy needs, and secondary 
motivation, the evocation of action in relation to secondary reinforcing stimuli or incentives. 
Primary motivation is the cornerstone of Hull's renowned drive reduction theory. According to 
Hull, events that threilten survival give rise to internal drive states. Behiwiors that act to reduce 
drive are valuable, and are thus seen as rewarding. For instance, lack of food causes iln increment 
in the hunger drive, and the consumption of food is rewarding because it can lead to a reduction 
in the hunger drive. 
A stimulus, when repeatedly associated with a situation leading to onset of a drive state, 
Cill1 become an acquired drive. Once developed, an acquired drive can motivate behavior on 
subsequent occilsions, even in the absence of cues that elicit the original drive state. Stimuli with 
this property become incentives, and their ability to evoke behaviors is known as secondary or 
incentive motivation. For instance, throughout our lives we learn to associate the sight of food 
with the impending act of consuming food, so that we get hungry when we see food. 
As stated above, motivated behavior requires both drives and appropriate stimuli. Hull's 
theory captures this relationship by proposing that the behavior potential for a given action is 
calculated by multiplication between the strength of the drive and the level of the incentive 
associated with that action. We will see below how this form of cooperative interaction is captured 
in neural network models of motivated behavior. 
In our daily experiences we are faced with a continuously fluctuating combination of multiple 
drives and incentives. Somehow we must be able to select the behavior that is most appropriate 
in a given situation, while suppressing othe1; less adequate behaviors. Thus, motivated behavior 
require'S a form of cotnpetition. According to Hull, at ilny given time the behavior with the greatest 
potentia I to reduce a given drive is released. If the drive persists, that behavior is inhibited, and the 
second strongest response in the drive hierarchy will be released, i1nd so on. This sort of dynamic 
competition can also be nilturally expressed with certain types of neural networks. 
The idea of motivation hi1S been used explicitly only by a handful of neural network researchers. 
The work of Grossberg and his colleagues (see the collections by Grossberg, 1982, 1986, 1989), 
whose efforts to model human behavior with dynamic neural networks span the past three 
decades, provides a computi1tional neural fr<1mework within which it is possible to give a natural 
interpretc1tion to the concept of Jnotivation, and to the role of driv<~S and incentives in the ?/'neration 
of purposive behiwior. Tlw review will thus begin with an overview of Grossberg's theory. Having 
established a formal link between the neural and psychological definitions of motivation, we will 
then discuss other neural network models, including those of Klopf (ch. 7 of Byrne & Berry,] 989), 
and Sutton and Barto (]990), in which motivation implicitly or explicitly plays a role. Finally, 
we will also review recent experimental and modeling work showing that neural ilnalogs of 
motivation and drives have been uncovered even in simple invertebrates. 
Classical Conditioning and Motivation 
The study of self-organizing behavior in biological organisms has been central to the work of 
Grossberg and his colleagues. Beginning in the 1960s, Grossberg developed a simple but powerful 
neur;1lnetwork model of reill-time associative learning known as the outs tar (see Grossberg, 1982, 
ch. 3 for a review). The outstar (see rightmost population in fig.1) is il real-time model, described 
by differential eqm1tions, which captures the essence of associative learning as it is used in milny 
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contemporary neural network models (see Carpenter, 1989). At the he~rt of the outstar learning 
law is ~ f~miliar form of associative le~rning, frequently referred to ~s Hebbian learning (see 
ch.?? of this volume), whereby synaptic strength is modul~ted by correlated presynaptic and 
postsynaptic activation. However, Grossberg suggested that in order to study even elementary 
learning such as classical or Pavlovian comiitioning, one must analyze network behavior beyond the 
single synapse. 
In classical conditioning (see Mackintosh, 1983, for a review), an animal learns to associate 
a previously neutr21l stimulus, called the conditioned stimulus (CS), with 21 stimulus that elicits an 
unconditioned response (UR), and which is thus called the unconditioned stimulus (US). As a result 
of the 21ssociation, the CS becomes able to elicit a conditioned response (CR) that closely resembles 
the LJR. Ivan Pavlov first noticed this form of conditioning while studying digestion in dogs. After 
receiving food repeatedly from a lab assistant, the dogs associated the assistant's arrival with the 
impending mml, ~nd immedi~tely beg~n s~liv~ting when they saw the assist~nt. Associ~tions of 
this type can ~lso be formed between neutr~l stimuli and aversive events: P~vlov w~s ~ble to show 
th~t dogs would begin to s~liv~te ~t the sound of a metronome, if th~t sound h~d been presented 
repe~tedly just prior to food delivery. 
Associative le~rning ~nd cl~ssical conditioning sh~re a number of fe~tures. It is even likely that 
cl~ssical conditioning relies on ~ssociative learning mechanisms. One import~nt difference is th~t 
cl~ssic~l conditioning reve~ls a motivational component of learning. M~ny eleg~nt experiments 
m~ke it cle~r th~t although the associ21tion, or contiguity, between CS ~nd US is necessary for 
cl~ssic~l conditioning to occur, it is not ~~w~ys sufficient. The phenomenon of blockins illustrates 
this point particularly well. In~ blocking par21digm (first shown by K~min, 1968), a neutral CS is 
first classically conditioned to a US as ~bove. Now a second neutral stimulus (CS2) is repeatedly 
presented sinJuitaneously with the CS, followed by the same US. CS2 is e1 stimulus th~t norm~lly, 
if repe~tedly preceding the US, would becorne cond.itioned. However, bec~use it is presented 
together with the previously conditioned CS, the second stimulus never le~rns to elicit the CR. 
Intuitively, this phenomenon is not so surprising. The animal h~s previously le~nwd that the 
CS predicts ~ cc'rt~in import~nt event. For ex~mple, '' bright light (CS) that regularly precedes 
the onset of~ shock (US) will evcntu~lly elicit fear (CR). At this point, il tone (CS2) presented 
simultaneously with the light before the shock will not learn to elicit feil!". 
The blocking paradigm shows that tlw rnotiv~tion~l state of the i1nimal can prevent it from 
le~rning ~n associ~tion betwec'n two correlated events. In blocking, present~tion of the light (~fter 
conditioning) elicits~ motiv~ted fear beh~vior th~t focuses the anim~l's ~ttention on I: he impending 
shock, preventing other stimuli such ~s the tone from becoming the primarily ~ttended stimuli. 
This is~ very useful property of biologic~llearning systems: in the words of Willi~m james, every 
d~y we ~re bomb~rded by il "blooming, buzzing confusion." Whenever something import21nt 
h~ppens in our lives, there ~re scores of cues in the environment. Somehow our br~in must be 
~ble to selectively ignore irrelev~nt cues, only focusing on those cues th~t are valuable for our 
survivaL Hence notions such 1:1s motivation can be used to extend associative learning to c:lassiGll 
conditioning, a more useful form of le~rning for humans ~nd imimals. 
Neural network models of classical conditioning 
Cl~ssical conditioning c21ptures fundamental aspects ofhum~n ~nd ~nimalle~rning that ~pply 
to real-world situations. Extensive discussions of these issues c~n be found in this volume and 
elsewhere (e.g., Rescorl~, 1988; Turkk~n, 1989), but the point is th~t neur~l networks that take 
into account the known properties of classical conditioning may extend the power of ~ssoci~tive 
learning to the realm of real-time motiv~ted behavior in complex environments. This is one of the 
driving forces behind Grossberg's work th~t we will now describe. 
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Fig.l: Diagram of Grossberg's conditioning circuit, illustrating interactions between sensory 
representation cells (S), polyvalent cells (1'), and drive representations (D). Thick lines with 
arrowheads represent strong, fixed connections (signals from the US, from homeostatic sources, 
and from D to 1'). Thinner lines with semicircle ends represent modifiable synapses. Dashed lines 
represent feedback connections. Each P cell connected to a CS is the source node of an outstar, 
which learns the pattern of ilCtivity (UR) generated by US activation. 
Grossberg's outstar model is based on the observation that although correlation (Hebbian) 
learning is important, the elementary learning element cannot be the single synapse (seep. 410 
of Grossberg, 1989). A stimulus (like a light) has the potential to be paired with any one of 
many different USs, some of which wiil happen to occur in contiguity with the stimulus during 
an animal's lifetime, causing increases in associative strength. Howeve1~ activity should not be 
elicited by i1 neuron representing a stimulus unless there has been consistent pairing between a US 
and the stimulus. The consistent pairing will raise the associative strength between the stimulus 
and the US significantly more than other associations. Hence what matters is the pattern of relative 
synaptic strengths originating from i1 single source neuron representing a stimulus. Grossberg 
(see ch. 1 of Grossberg, 1982) has shown mathematically that the outs tar can learn, recognize, imd 
recall spatial patterns by sampling the activity impinging upon the synapses emanating from the 
source neuron. The synapses are said to form the outstill''s border. 
Grossberg's conditioning circuit 
The outstm extends associative learning, but does not include mechanisms for motivational 
biases of the type revealed by the blocking paradigm. Grossberg's conditioning circuit was 
developed by asking how learning in the outstar might be modified to account for classical 
conditioning phenomena (Grossberg, 1971 ). Grossberg's derivation (see esp. ch. ·1 of Grossberg, 
'I 986) is based on a series of psychological postulates, which are used to motivate successive 
modifications to the outstar. We summarize here only the key charactc'ristics of the model. 
A simplified version of Grossberg's model model is presented in figure ·1. Incoming sensory 
stimuli converge on a population of sensory representation cells (labeled S). Competitive interac-
tions ensure that the most salient cues are stored in the sensory representation network, while 
suppressing weaker cues. Presentation of a US sends an excitatory signal to a drive representation 
node (labeled D) and a second, simultaneous sigm1l to an additional field of sensory representa-
tions (labeled P). Neurons in the /' field are polyvalent, i.e., they require convergence of sensory 
and drive inputs to become active (for a discussion of polyvalent cells and their existence in the 
brain, see ch. 1 of Grossberg, '1986). Each cell Pis the source node of an outstm, which in principle 
can learn the behavior (or rnotor habit) generated by the US. 
The drive node D is also polyvalent, but in this case it requires converging inputs from a 
sensory cue <md from il11 internal homeostatic signal corresponding to a particular drive, such i1S 
C. Dorman and P. Gaudiano, Motivation 4 
hunger. Prior to conditioning, a neutral sensory cue is unable to activate the drive node D even 
in the presence of a strong homeostatic signal, so that its corresponding polyvalent cell cannot 
become active. Lf a CS is active when a US is turned on, the sensory representation of the CS will 
be suppressed because of the strong, competing US input. However, the US will also activate the 
drive node, giving the CS a brief opportunity to strengthen its synapse to the drive node. At the 
same time, drive signals are sent to all polyvalent cells, including the polyvalent cell receiving 
inputs from the CS, which therefore has a brief opportunity to learn the activity pattern generated 
by the US (i.e., the U R). 
With sufficient pairing between the US and CS, the CS learns to excite the drive node by itself, 
and therefore is able to activate its polyvalent cell, which in turn can read out the CR, a learned 
copy of the response originally elicited by the US. 
Feedback connections from the polyvalent cells to the corresponding sensory cells provides a 
form of attentional feedback, whereby a sensory cue that can activate its polyvalent cell via the drive 
representation, will establish sustained activation in the competitive field. 
Psychological interpretation 
Even in this simplified form, the model sheds light on some of the psychological terms pre-
sented in the first part of this review. First, sensory stimuli that are repeatedly paired with drive 
<lCtivations acquire reinforcing property, and thus become incentives, or secondary reinforcers. 
Reinforcer and homestatic signals combine at the drive representation, giving rise to incentive 
motivation associated with each drive. The joint action of drives and reinforcers in the network 
thus embody Hull's intuition that drives and incentives combine in a multiplicative fashion. 
The incentive motivation signal combines with the sensory signals at the polyvalent cells to 
read out a pattern that corresponds to the behavior that is appropriate for the given combination 
of drive and sensory signals. 
The competitive interactions and feedback loop (from sensory representations to drive node, 
to polyv<1lent cells, 2111d back to sensory representations) explain why blocking occurs: a cue that 
has learned to control the drive node can quickly establish itself into memory, and suppress other 
"neutral" cues through the competitive inter<Ktions (see Grossberg & Levine, ch. 9 of Grossberg, 
1989). 
The model also explains second order conditioning, the phenomenon whereby a previously 
conditioned CS1 can serve as a "substitute US" and lead to conditioning of a neutral CS2. Second 
order conditioning is import21nt beGlUSe it suggests that we can be driven to behave by stimuli 
that have acquired significance for us through classical conditioning. In fact, Grossberg (1982, 
reprinted ilS ch. 1 of Grossberg, 1986) argues that the US and CS should be treated equolly within 
the network, the only difference being that a few "primary" USs hove hard-wired connections 
to the arousal node and to the border cells, which lead to the generation of the corresponding 
behavior (U R). 
The drive node in Grossberg's circuit closely parallels Hull's prim<ll'Y motivation. For instance, 
activ21tion of the US node representing food does not lead to eating behavior (the CR) if the animal 
is not hungry. Similarly, when the animal is hungry, eating should not occur unless there is a 
stimulus representing food present. 
Grossberg (1982, reprinted as ch:J of Grossberg, 1986) has suggested that the drive represen-
tation node actually consists of a population of competing channels, with each channel combin-
ing sensory and drive information within a feedback competitive scheme. Competition within 
each channel determines what sensory stimuli Me associated with each drive, while competition 
between channels ensures that a single beh<wior is emitted, depending on the combination of 
environmental stimuli and internal needs. Grossberg called this additional component of the 
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network the sensory-drive heterarchy (see Grossberg & Schtnajuk, ch. 10 of Grossberg, 1989). 
The above description is only meant to give the reader a sense of the origin and significance 
of Grossberg's model of conditioning. Grossberg's original work should be consulted for further 
details (Grossberg, 1971, 1982, 1986, 1989). It is historically interesting to note that many of the 
fundamental ideas that Grossberg derived from his study of conditioning permeate most of his 
later work, including for instance his work on Adaptive Resonance Theory (see chapter?? of this 
Handbook). 
We can summarize what we have learned about the possible role of motivation in neural 
networks: Grossberg's model suggests that drives (primary motivation) energize the learning 
network, and therefore control whether or not a given association will form between sensory <md 
drive representations. As a result, the model captures many properties of classical conditioning 
and explains how an organism can modulate associative learning on the basis of motivational 
factors. 
Drives in biological and artificial neural networks 
The idea of "drive" nodes that control learning is found in several other neural network 
models. The models of Klopf (ch. 7 of Byrne & Berry, 1989) and Sutton and Barto (1990) explicitly 
incorporate the idea of a drive node. Klopf's drive-reinforcement theory suggests that the onset 
of stimuli has reinforcing properties, and thus energizes associative learning. Sutton and Barto 
(1990) propose the existence of an eligibility trace that determines when learning can occur. Aside 
from making interesting predictions i1bout conditioning phenomena, the work of Sutton, Barto, 
and their co11eagues has led to <1 number of useful applications in which a system must improve its 
performance on the basis of only general information about its success or failure. Neur<11 network 
models of this clc1ss are usually referred to as reinforcement learning models. 
Strong support for the existence of drive representations has actually come from experimental 
and modeling work on invertebrates such as the molluscs Aplysia and Hermissenda. Alkon (ch. 1 
of Byrne & Berry, 1989), Hawkins (ch. 5 of Byrne & Berry, 1989), and Byrne and his coileagues 
(Buonomano, Baxtet~ & Byrne, 1990) have found evidence for facilitator neurons in both of these 
species. While the locc1tion <md specific <Ktion of these neurons differs in the different preparations, 
in <111 cases the role of the filcilitator neuron is very similar to that of drive representations: it is 
closely linked to fundamenli1l aspects of the animal's life, such <1S the onsc~t of shock, and it serves 
to modulate learning .:1t associ.:1tive:~ syni'lpses. Sin1il<-1r neuralJnechanisnls that n1odulate learning 
at c1ssocic1tive synapses have been found in a variety of preparations, including both vertebrates 
and invertebrates (see Byrne & Berry, 1989). 
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